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Abstract 
 
Labor union shareholders have become increasingly vocal in matters of corporate 
governance, however, their motives have been subject to much debate in the academic 
literature and business press.  I examine the proxy votes of AFL-CIO pension funds in 
director elections of 504 companies from 2003 to 2006.  Using the 2005 AFL-CIO 
breakup as a source of exogenous variation in the union affiliations of workers across 
firms, I find that AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders are significantly more supportive of 
director nominees once the AFL-CIO no longer represents workers or represents 
significantly fewer workers at a given firm.  Other institutional investors do not exhibit 
the same changes in voting behavior.  This difference suggests that labor relations affect 
the voting patterns of some union shareholders.  I also find that AFL-CIO funds are more 
likely to vote against directors of firms in which there is greater frequency of plant-level 
conflict between labor unions and management during collective bargaining and union 
member recruiting.  The sensitivity of director votes to union conflict, however, 
decreases at firms in which the AFL-CIO no longer represents workers or represents 
significantly fewer workers.  The evidence suggests that AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders 
vote against directors partly to support union worker interests rather than increase 
shareholder value alone.  
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Introduction 
Labor union pension funds, particularly those affiliated with the AFL-CIO, have 
recently come under scrutiny for their role in affecting boards of directors at U.S. 
corporations.  Critics argue that unions use their shareholder clout to advance worker 
interests under the guise of pursuing shareholder value.  For example, in response to the 
AFL-CIO's calls to overhaul Safeway's board and lower CEO pay in 2004, Safeway Vice 
President Brian Dowling claimed: 
 
Union leadership has threatened to attack Safeway CEO Steve Burd and 
individual members of Safeway's board as a pressure tactic to get better results 
during labor negotiations, and these union-backed pension funds are carrying 
through on that threat. – Safeway Proxy Materials, March 25, 2004 
 
Union leaders counter that their behavior is intended simply to protect pension assets: 
 
Irresponsible directors must be removed to rein in excessive CEO pay that 
ultimately robs working families of their retirement security.  
– Richard Trumka, AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer, Press Release, April 15, 2004 
 
Distinguishing amongst the various motivations of labor union shareholders is 
complicated because worker gains are often in line with shareholder value.  Empirical 
identification requires a setting in which shareholders’ labor interests vary independently 
of factors that impact the return on equity.   
This paper exploits a natural experiment to test whether the governance objectives 
of some labor union shareholders are motivated by worker interests rather than equity 
value maximization alone.  In 2005, the AFL-CIO (the central federation of labor unions 
in the United States) split into two groups because of power struggles within its 
leadership (Chaison, 2007).  The AFL-CIO was greatly reduced in size as several of its 
member unions left to form a new organization — the Change To Win (CTW) coalition.  
As a result, the union affiliation of workers across many companies immediately 
switched from the AFL-CIO to the CTW.  I examine the effects of this switch on the 
proxy voting behavior of two of the AFL-CIO’s main equity funds at annual director 
elections for 504 U.S. publicly traded corporations before and after the breakup (from 
2003 to 2006).  The votes cast by these funds are representative of the votes cast by AFL-
CIO affiliated union pension funds with holdings on the order of $100 billion in 
aggregate size.  I measure how the AFL-CIO funds’ director votes change when the 
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workers of a given firm become significantly less represented, or not represented at all, 
by the AFL-CIO.  I compare this to their voting behavior at firms in which the AFL-
CIO’s union representation of workers remains relatively constant.  I then estimate the 
added voting impact of plant-level conflict arising between labor unions and firm 
managers during collective bargaining and union membership recruiting.   
Finance theory typically assumes that shareholders only care to maximize equity 
value (Shleifer and Vishny 1988).  There is little theoretical or empirical work depicting 
investors with heterogeneous preferences.1  However, recent examples of corporate 
governance conflict, such as that of Safeway, suggest that shareholders may have 
disparate objectives.  These preferences are revealed by behavior in director elections.  I 
find that when a firm’s main unionized employees change affiliation from the AFL-CIO 
to a different labor organization, the AFL-CIO funds become significantly more 
supportive of the firm’s directors in subsequent board elections.  The funds are 14-18% 
more likely to vote for, rather than against, director nominees.  Moreover, the voting 
behavior of the AFL-CIO funds does not change at firms in which workers remain 
primarily affiliated with the AFL-CIO or at firms in which there are no unionized 
employees at all.   
The causal interpretation of this finding is dependent upon the identifying 
assumption that changes in employee-union affiliation are independent of simultaneous, 
unobservable changes in factors that affect shareholder value (such as director quality).  
This assumption is investigated by comparison of the AFL-CIO funds’ proxy votes with 
votes cast by several large institutional investors: Fidelity, Vanguard, and TIAA-CREF.2  
                                                 
1 There are several papers which examine heterogeneity among shareholders stemming either from 
different tax rates on capital gains (Eckbo and Verma 1994), cross-ownership of shares through diverse 
portfolio holdings (Matvos and Ostrovsky 2007, Harford, Jenter, and Li 2006), or from having multiple 
claims on firm profits, as in the case of employee stock holders (Jensen and Meckling 1979, Blasi, Conti, 
and Kruse 1996, and Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck 2006).  This paper, in contrast, focuses on shareholders 
who are not necessarily employees of the companies in which they own stock and who likely face the same 
portfolio and tax rate considerations as other institutional investors such as mutual funds.  See Romano 
(2001) and Schwab and Thomas (1998) for theoretical motivations for union shareholder activity in U.S. 
corporations.  
2 The identification assumption is also motivated by two other pieces of evidence.  First, various accounts 
indicate that the breakup of the AFL-CIO stemmed from conflict among the federation’s leaders and 
appears unrelated to the characteristics of sample firms and directors (Chaison, 2007).  Second, I find that 
there are no significant differences or trends in many observable balance sheet characteristics of firms 
whose workers stay in the AFL-CIO and firms whose workers switch to the Change to Win Coalition, 
suggesting a low likelihood that there are simultaneous, unobservable changes occurring at the firm or 
director level that are associated with the union reorganization.   
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If there are endogenous changes occurring at the firm or director level, then other 
shareholders who have incentives to monitor these developments and maximize 
shareholder value should vote accordingly (Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Zeckhauser and 
Pound 1990, and Black 1992).3  The evidence indicates that mutual fund director votes 
do not respond to the change in worker union affiliation spurred by the AFL-CIO’s 
breakup.  Therefore, it is unlikely that there are unobservable changes occurring at th
firm or director level that are correlated with realignments in worker-union affiliation
The change in the AFL-CIO funds’ voting behavior coupled with the lack of a sim
response by other institutional investors suggests that firm-union labor relations have a 
causal effect on the director votes cast by the AFL-CIO funds.  
e 
s.  
ilar 
                                                
I also examine the director voting behavior of the United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBCJA) labor union pension funds.  The UBCJA, 
which was not a member of the AFL-CIO, joined the Change To Win coalition during its 
formation in 2005.4  UBCJA pension funds vote uniformly across sample firms and the 
aggregate size of their holdings studied in this paper is on the order of $20 billion.  After 
joining the CTW coalition, the UBCJA’s funds increase their opposition to directors of 
firms that mainly employ CTW employees by at least 22%.  In contrast, the UBCJA 
funds’ voting behavior remains relatively constant at firms primarily affiliated with the 
AFL-CIO throughout the sample period.  This evidence suggests that the effect of worker 
representation on director votes is not simply limited to funds associated with the AFL-
CIO, but rather is consistent with the behavior of other union shareholders as well.5    
I then find evidence that the AFL-CIO funds’ opposition towards directors 
appears to serve union worker interests.  Estimates of the added voting impact of plant-
level conflict between labor unions and management indicate that AFL-CIO funds are at 
least 14% more likely to withhold support from directors when there are disputes 
involving either collective bargaining or the unionization of unrepresented workers.  This 
behavior could reflect two objectives.  First, the AFL-CIO funds may vote against 
directors to improve worker bargaining power when there is labor conflict.  Second, the 
 
3 Additionally, the presence of institutional investors at these firms is likely to provide incentives to director 
boards to pursue shareholder-value maximization (Allen, Bernardo, Welch 2000).  For example, they may 
have greater incentive to nominate high quality directors.  
4 The UBCJA was a member union of the AFL-CIO until it disaffiliated from the AFL-CIO in 2001.     
5 This evidence also supports the central identification assumption that the union reorganization is not 
correlated with unobservable changes to director quality. 
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AFL-CIO funds may vote against directors to limit labor strife because they believe such 
disputes hurt shareholder value.   
To distinguish between these two possible objectives, I estimate the change in 
sensitivity of director votes to labor strife at firms in which the AFL-CIO no longer 
represents workers or represents significantly fewer workers.  If union-management 
conflict is costly to investors and the AFL-CIO funds are solely interested in maximizing 
shareholder value, then the union affiliation of workers involved in disputes with 
management should not affect the funds’ votes.  However, the data suggest that the AFL-
CIO funds’ sensitivity to labor strife decreases significantly at firms in which workers 
become significantly less represented, or not represented at all, by the AFL-CIO.  In other 
words, though the AFL-CIO funds are more likely to vote against directors at firms 
where there is manager-union conflict, they become 21-33% less likely to oppose 
directors of those firms when employees leave the AFL-CIO.  This change in director 
opposition implies that the AFL-CIO funds’ proxy votes appear to be affected by labor 
strife primarily when the workers involved are AFL-CIO members.  
I also examine alternative explanations for the voting behavior of AFL-CIO 
funds.  First, I explore the extent to which portfolio selection decisions may bias 
estimates of voting patterns.  Turnover in the holdings of the AFL-CIO funds does not 
seem to respond to the union reorganization.  In particular, the AFL-CIO does not appear 
to adjust its holdings for or against firms whose workers belong to a specific union.   
Furthermore, the findings discussed above are valid for a restricted sample of firms that 
appear in the AFL-CIO fund portfolios both before and after the formation of the CTW.  
Second, I explore the impact of private information that may be gleaned by the AFL-CIO 
pension funds through their affiliation with workers.  When the AFL-CIO no longer 
represents workers in a firm, the AFL-CIO funds may lose access to this private 
information and subsequently change their voting behavior.  This hypothesis, however, is 
rejected by regression estimates.  Third, I examine whether the voting estimates are 
biased by the potentially endogenous timing of AFL-CIO proxy votes and the union 
reorganization.  This hypothesis, however, also lacks significant explanatory power. 
This paper adds to several strands of literature.  First, the study provides unique 
empirical evidence that the preferences of labor union shareholders may reflect objectives 
other than equity value maximization.  While there is debate in the academic literature 
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and business press that labor unions use their pension funds to pursue worker interests, 
there is little data to support the numerous viewpoints.  The findings in this paper support 
theories postulated by Romano (2001) and Schwab and Thomas (1998).  Second, this 
paper contributes to the corporate governance literature on proxy voting.6  Davis and 
Kim (2007), Matvos and Ostrovsky (2007), and Rothberg and Lilien (2005) utilize 
recent, publicly disclosed data to explore various voting incentives facing mutual fund 
managers.  In contrast, this paper utilizes data on labor union pension fund proxy votes to
study the governance objectives of union shareholders.  Third, this work contrib
burgeoning literature on the role of employee stakeholders on corporate decisions and 
outcomes (Atannasov and Kim 2008, Chen, Kacperzyck, Molina 2008).  This study 
suggests that union shareholder activists look towards corporate governance mechanisms 
as a means of furthering the goals of unionized employees.  Finally, the data shed light 
onto policy discussions concerning potential governance reforms.  One contentious issue 
currently facing the SEC is whether shareholders should be given greater powers over 
corporate affairs through increased access to annual director election ballots (see 
Bebchuk (2005), Harris and Raviv (2007), and Bainbridge (2006) for further discussion).  
Labor union activists such as the AFL-CIO generally favor greater shareholder powers as 
a means of improving the financial performance of firms.  However, other groups such as 
the Business Roundtable argue that greater shareholder powers would ironically empower 
special-interest investors to advance their agendas at the expense of shareholder value 
(McKinell 2003).  The underlying question in this debate is whether shareholders have 
disparate preferences to begin with.   
 
utes to a 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background on 
labor unions, a description of the natural experiment, and a discussion of proxy voting 
and union shareholder activism.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 presents the 
empirical framework, results, and analysis.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
Section 2: Institutional Background  
Labor unions have been an integral part of the American workforce over the past 
century.  During the early 1900’s, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the 
                                                 
6 See Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Shleifer and Vishny (2001), and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
for related work on boards of directors and corporate governance more generally.  
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Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were the two preeminent labor groups in the 
U.S.  In 1955, they merged to form the AFL-CIO, representing almost all organized 
workers in the American private sector.  The AFL-CIO currently comprises many of the 
major unions in the United States such as the United Auto Workers, United Steel 
Workers, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, etc.  Each member union of 
the AFL-CIO has local chapters that represent employees at different workplaces.  The 
AFL-CIO is the governing body of the unions and coordinates worker representation 
across the national landscape.  It influences regulatory reform, collective bargaining, and 
labor disputes with employers.   
Labor unions engage in two types of activities that are governed by the U.S. 
National Labor Relations Boards (NLRB): collective bargaining (negotiating 
compensation and employment conditions with employers) and union member 
recruiting.  Each of these functions is often a source of conflict between firms and labor 
organizations.  A common collective bargaining dispute arises when an employer refuses 
to recognize union representatives when setting wages for its workers, as in the recent 
case of Shaw’s Supermarkets (National Labor Relations Board 2007).  Another typical 
dispute arises when unions attempt to recruit non-represented laborers into their 
organizations, as recent turmoil at Wal-Mart illustrates (Greenhouse 2007).  When such 
conflicts cannot be privately resolved, a labor union or a firm may file a complaint with 
the NLRB, citing an Unfair Labor Practice (ULP).  The NLRB will in turn mediate 
between the various parties to develop a resolution in accordance with federal law.7 
While the regulations governing labor unions have remained in place since the 
1930’s, the size and structure of unions have changed over time.  Since its peak in 1954 
at approximately 25 million workers or 39.2% of the U.S. workforce, the number of 
organized laborers has declined to 15.4 million or 12% of the U.S. workforce in 2006 
(Congressional Digest 1993; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007).  In addition to declining 
membership, there has more recently been a shift in union organization.  On September 
27, 2005, six of the largest member groups of the AFL-CIO (Teamsters, United Food 
and Commercial Workers, Service Employees International, UNITE HERE, United 
Farm Workers and the Laborers International Union of North America) formed their 
                                                 
7 In particular, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 stipulates various conditions that must be satisfied 
by labor unions and employers regarding activities such as collective bargaining, new member 
unionization, worker strikes, etc.  
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own organization – the Change to Win Coalition – and consummated an exit from the 
AFL-CIO.8  Approximately 35% of the 13 million workers in the AFL-CIO switched to 
the CTW. The workers remained unionized and mostly subject to the collective 
bargaining agreements that were previously in place with their respective employers.  
The main impact of the union reorganization on these workers is that they are now under 
the umbrella of a different national entity.   
Accounts of the union’s dissolution center around two explanations, each of 
which is corroborated by Chaison (2007).  The more common explanation is that the 
CTW union leaders were locked in an irreconcilable power struggle with current AFL-
CIO president John Sweeney.  Sweeney even remarked, “The fact is that the real issue 
for these unions is not one of policy or direction, but rather who controls and leads the 
Federation” (AFL-CIO 2005).  A second explanation is that the CTW unions had a 
different organizational and strategic vision for the future of the labor movement.  The 
CTW coalition believed the AFL-CIO focuses too much of its resources on electoral 
politics rather than on the organization of new workers.  Teamsters President James 
Hoffa went so far as to say that the AFL-CIO is content with “throwing away money to 
politicians” (Edsall 2005).  In either case, the explanations are supportive of this paper’s 
central identification assumption: the AFL-CIO’s reorganization appears unrelated to the 
particular characteristics of unionized companies (such as director quality) that affect 
shareholder value.   
The source of exogenous variation in the union representation of workers makes 
pension fund behavior a natural setting in which to examine different preferences among 
shareholders.  Union pension funds are comprised of contributions made by both union 
workers and their employers.  Approximately 46% of all union pension assets are 
invested in domestic equities as of September 30, 2006 (Appell 2007).  Ownership of 
voting shares in a U.S. publicly traded company gives shareholders the right to cast votes 
in the company’s corporate elections.  A typical election will call for shareholders to 
vote on ballot items such as nominees to the board of directors, amendments to executive 
compensation packages, auditor approvals, and shareholder initiated proposals.  Like 
                                                 
8 The United Brotherhood of Carpenters also joined the Change to Win Coalition, however at the time it 
was not part of the AFL-CIO.  
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mutual funds and public pension funds, union funds will act as a ‘proxy’ for individual 
pension fund participants and cast votes on their behalf, hence the term proxy voting.   
Many union pension funds in turn coordinate their proxy voting decisions by 
employing a third-party fiduciary to administer their votes.  These fiduciaries utilize 
standards set by the AFL-CIO Office of Investment and communicate with union 
pension fund officials when voting.9  Marco Consulting, one of the largest proxy voting 
services in the U.S., is an example of one such third-party fiduciary.  During the sample 
period studied in this paper, Marco Consulting follows proxy voting guidelines 
established by the AFL-CIO and casts proxy votes uniformly across many AFL-CIO 
affiliated union pension funds, including the ones studied in this paper.  For example, in 
a director election for Boeing, Marco Consulting casts identical votes for all AFL-CIO 
affiliated funds it manages which hold Boeing shares.  The aggregate size of AFL-CIO 
affiliated pension funds that invest in the firms studied in this paper during the sample 
period and that are also managed by Marco Consulting is on the order of $100 billion in 
assets.  ProxyVote Plus is another fiduciary that manages proxy votes for numerous 
pension funds belonging to the UBCJA.  ProxyVote Plus also communicates with union 
pension fund officials and votes uniformly across the holdings of many UBCJA pension 
funds during this paper’s sample period.  The aggregate size of the UBCJA holdings 
studied in this paper is on the order of $20 billion in assets. 
The AFL-CIO’s role in corporate elections is noteworthy for several reasons.  
AFL-CIO union pension funds are some of the most involved shareholder activists 
among all classes of investors that participate in elections.  In 2006, union funds 
accounted for more shareholder proposals than any other investor group.  They 
submitted 295 out of 699 shareholder proposals at U.S. publicly traded corporations.  
Public pension funds issued 31 proposals while mutual funds issued 23.  The two most 
prolific issuers of union shareholder plans accounted for more than half of all union 
proposals: the AFL-CIO submitted 28 (primarily through the funds examined in this 
                                                 
9 The AFL-CIO Office of Investment produces its own set of Proxy Voting Guidelines, which are available 
online at: http://www.AFL-CIO.org/corporatewatch/capital/upload/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf.   In these 
guidelines, the AFL-CIO states that proxy votes for their pension funds should be cast in a manner 
‘consistent the economic best interests of plan participants and beneficiaries’; this calls for the 
consideration of corporate policies which not just maximize “share value and dividend yield”, but also 
“corporate policies that affect employment security and wage levels of plan participants.” (AFL-CIO proxy 
voting guidelines, pg. 2).  The findings in this paper appear consistent with these stated objectives. 
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paper) while the UBCJA submitted 120 (Burr 2007).  Recent work suggests that such 
institutional investor activism has a significant impact on firms’ governance decisions 
(Del Guercio, Seery and Woidtke 2008)10.   
The AFL-CIO is also instrumental in promoting financial market regulations 
related to corporate elections.  It has influenced the passage of recent laws on mutual 
fund proxy voting disclosure, board independence, and outside auditors that are 
generally considered favorable reforms for labor union shareholders (AFL-CIO(a) 2003, 
AFL-CIO(b) 2003).  Currently, the AFL-CIO plays an active role in promoting greater 
shareholder access to corporate ballots (Trumka 2003).  Union shareholder activists are 
calling on the SEC to pass laws that would grant shareholders the right to officially 
appoint their own nominees to corporate boards of directors.  Currently, nominees are 
only officially nominated on company ballots by boards.   
Although AFL-CIO funds comprise a small fraction of the shares in publicly 
traded corporations, their activism is perceived to have a strong impact on corporate 
directors.  For example, at Safeway’s May 20, 2004 shareholder meeting, investors 
withheld 17% of their votes to appoint CEO Steven Burd to the board of directors.  
Although he successfully gained a seat, labor union shareholders claimed victory, citing 
their pressure on management as a leading factor in the board’s eventual decision to 
appoint a new lead independent director, remove two individuals from its audit and 
executive compensation committees, and eliminate three members of the board (Adamy 
2004).  Other examples of union pension funds targeting boards of directors include 
Verizon, CVS/Caremark, and Toll Brothers (Tse 2007).   
The impact of labor union investors on director elections is especially relevant to 
the current debate over shareholder power reform facing the SEC.  On July 25, 2007, 
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox cast the deciding vote on two contentious proposals 
stipulating conditions aimed at amending shareholder powers in corporate elections.  In 
the middle of the policy debate are labor union shareholders who support proposals that 
increase shareholder powers.  Opponents of such reform (e.g. the Business Roundtable 
and Wall Street Journal) argue that these changes would be subject to abuse by special-
interest parties—particularly AFL-CIO affiliated labor union pension funds (McKinnel 
                                                 
10 See Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2007) for analysis pertaining to the impact of hedge fund 
shareholder activism.   
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2003, Wall Street Journal 2006).  While this paper does not address whether shareholder 
powers should be increased, it does find that shareholders appear to have heterogeneous 
preferences and that the disparate objectives of investors should be considered when 
discussing shareholder power reform.11      
 
Section 3: Data 
3.1 Proxy Votes and Firm Characteristics 
 I collect annual data from the AFL-CIO Office of Investment on the equity 
holdings of the AFL-CIO Reserve Fund and the AFL-CIO Staff Retirement Fund from 
January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2006.  The capital invested in these two funds, which 
are approximately $180 million in size, are partially contributed by direct staff employees 
of the AFL-CIO.12  The proxy votes cast by these funds (herein referred to as AFL-CIO 
funds) are noteworthy for two reasons.  First, the funds serve as the main vehicles for the 
AFL-CIO’s shareholder activism.  The AFL-CIO uses its ownership stakes via fund 
holdings to issue many of its activist shareholder proposals (Burr 2007).  Additionally, 
the proxy votes for these holdings serve as voting recommendations made to other 
investors.  Second, through Marco Consulting, the votes cast for these portfolios are 
representative of the votes of AFL-CIO affiliated union pension funds whose aggregate 
holdings are on the order of $100 billion in size.   
Across all firms in the two funds, I observe the shareholder elections in which the 
AFL-CIO funds participate.  For each election, I observe all ballot items such as 
individual director nominees, the recommendations made by the board of directors, and 
the votes cast by the AFL-CIO funds.  For numerous director elections the nominees’ 
names are missing.  To complete the data, I refer to the original proxy statements (Forms 
DEF 14A, available via SEC EDGAR) for each firm.  Several companies’ proxy 
statements are not available through the SEC.  Their filings are retrieved from the 
Investor Relations departments of the firms themselves.     
Panels A and B of Table 1 contain descriptive statistics of the sample shareholder 
elections and proxy votes of the AFL-CIO funds. There are a total of 504 firms that hold 
                                                 
11 Recent papers exploring this issue include Harris and Raviv (2007), Bebchuk (2005), Bainbridge (2006). 
12 It is likely that the Reserve fund’s assets are partly comprised of union membership dues.   Additionally, 
both funds likely contain a negligible fraction, if not 0%, of the retirement assets of all AFL-CIO affiliated 
workers employed in the private sector.   
 11
director elections at least once in the sample period for a total of 1,492 elections.  On 
average there are approximately 7 director nominees standing for election at each 
company, yielding a total sample of 10,407 directors over 4 years.  Director elections are 
the most frequent ballot items in shareholder meetings.  The next two most common 
ballot items are stock option-related proposals and auditor appointments, which arise 
almost 10% as often.  Boards recommend that shareholders vote in favor of all board-
appointed director nominees.  However, the AFL-CIO only supports approximately 65% 
of all candidates in the sample.  
I also obtain the proxy votes cast by three mutual fund families: Fidelity, TIAA-
CREF, and Vanguard.  I collect their proxy votes from SEC N-PX filings for July 1, 2003 
to December 31, 2006.  Within each mutual fund family, I choose an individual index 
fund that holds a broad array of securities: the Fidelity Spartan Total Market Index fund, 
the Vanguard Institutional Total Stock Market Index fund, and the TIAA-CREF Equity 
Index Fund.  For each director nominee for which the AFL-CIO funds cast a vote in the 
sample, I record the matching vote cast by each of the index funds.  Because of the short 
time period for which mutual fund proxy voting data is publicly available and because 
there are several firms held by the AFL-CIO funds that are not in the index funds, the 
match across institutional investors is imperfect13.  As Panel C of Table 1 indicates, I am 
able to match the votes for approximately 75% of all director nominees for each investor 
from July, 2003 onwards.  Fidelity votes in favor of 98% of all matched sample directors.  
Vanguard and TIAA-CREF support 89% and 93% of all matched sample directors, 
respectively. 
I collect proxy voting data for the UBCJA labor union pension funds for their 
S&P 500 investments from August 5, 2004 to December 31, 2006.14  The votes analyzed 
for UBCJA funds in the sample correspond to holdings on the order of $20 billion in 
aggregate size.  I am able to match 4,515 director votes from the AFL-CIO sample with 
the UBCJA sample.  The relatively low match rate is due to the limited time period for 
which director-level data are available and because of differences in holdings.  The 
UBCJA funds support 55% of all matched director nominees.  
                                                 
13  The SEC requires mutual fund proxy voting disclosure beginning in July, 2003. 
14 The UBCJA pension fund proxy voting data is obtained from ProxyVote Plus. 
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The vast majority of sample firms are in the S&P 500.  Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics tabulated from Compustat (where available) regarding the firms held 
in the AFL-CIO’s funds, along with S&P 500 attributes for comparison.15  Assets is the 
book value of assets.  Equity is the market value of outstanding equity.  Leverage is the 
ratio of long term debt to book value of equity.  EBITDA is Earnings before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization.  Capital Intensity is the ratio of PPE (net Plant, Property, and 
Equipment) to Assets.  As of 2005, the average sample firm has $54.4 billion worth of 
assets while the average S&P 500 firm has assets worth $48.4 billion.  The average 
number of employees of sample firms is 48.3 thousand while it is 46.5 thousand for S&P 
500 companies.  Capital Intensity is measured to compare the production technologies 
across firms.  The average ratio of PPE to Assets is 0.26 in the sample (0.24 for S&P 500 
firms).  There are no statistically significant differences at the 10% level between the 
balance sheet characteristics of sample firms and S&P 500 firms.  Additionally, the 
distribution of industries of sample firms mirrors that of the S&P 500.  Sample firms have 
some statistics which are slightly higher in magnitude than S&P 500 companies, due to 
the inclusion of several large international firms that have U.S. publicly traded stock but 
are not members of the S&P 500, such as Magna International and Honda Motor Co.  
  
3.2 Firms’ Employee-Union Labor Relations 
I collect data on the union affiliations of domestic workers involved in collective 
bargaining activity at each of the sample firms held by the AFL-CIO funds from a variety 
of publicly available sources.  The primary sources of data have been utilized by previous 
researchers (Dinardo and Lee, 2004, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Kochan 2004, Gomez and 
Tzioumis 2007, are recent examples).  Firm-level data on employee unionization is hand 
collected because there is currently no centralized, publicly available database which 
contains systematic information on firms’ employee-union affiliations.   
The primary source is the U.S. Department of Federal Mediation and Conciliatory 
Services (FMCS), a division of the U.S. Department of Labor.  The FMCS maintains a 
monthly listing of F-7 notices, available through a Freedom of Information Act request.  
Unions are required to file F-7 notices with the FMCS 30 days prior to the expiration of 
an existing collective bargaining agreement.  Using F-7 notices from January, 2003 to 
                                                 
15 I also obtain stock performance data from CRSP. 
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December, 2006, I collect all filings in which any union cites an expiring bargaining 
agreement with a firm in the sample.16  It is possible that some firms have agreements 
with unions that do not expire in the sample period, although most collective bargaining 
contracts last for approximately 3-5 years.  It is also possible that some firms or unions 
are non-compliant with FMCS notification laws, leading to downward bias in union 
representation.17   
I also consult various other sources of data.  I inspect individual 10K’s filed in 
2006 for each sample company.18  Firms often mention specific labor union activity in 
10K’s when it is significant.  Many companies also explicitly state that none of their 
employees belong to a union or are subject to a collective bargaining agreement.  I 
examine the National Labor Relations Board union elections and petitions data from 
January, 2001 to December, 2006, which contain records of all union elections and 
petitions that take place at any corporation in the U.S during this period.19  For each firm 
in the sample, I also search the U.S. Department of Labor’s public database of voluntarily 
provided collective bargaining agreements.  I also contact the investor relations 
departments of several companies with unionized employees.  Using these data sources, I 
identify whether firms have any unionized workers involved in collective bargaining, and 
if so, to which unions they belong.  Although this data is potentially subject to 
measurement error, it is likely that errors are restricted to firms in which union presence 
is minor (such as those with downward bias in union representation) and are unlikely to 
affect the estimation results.  Furthermore, it is likely that this measurement error causes 
voting pattern estimates to suffer from attenuation bias and understate the true impact of 
union labor interests on proxy voting.   
Using all sources, I categorize firms as belonging to one of three groups.  First, 
there are 258 non-unionized firms (e.g. Microsoft) which do not have any unionized 
workers in my sample.  Second, there are 181 firms whose main unionized workers in the 
sample maintain association with the AFL-CIO throughout the entire sample period (e.g. 
Ford Motor Company, whose workers mostly belong to the United Auto Workers union).  
                                                 
16 The dates correspond to the ‘Notice Date’ in each filing.  
17 This point is further discussed in Dinardo and Lee (2004).   
18 I also collect information from 10-K’s in 2003 for a large subsample of firms to corroborate information 
from 2006 reports.  
19 NLRB elections and petitions data is obtained from Research Associates of America (RAA), a non-profit 
union research entity. 
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Herein these firms are referred to as AFL-CIO-firms.  Third, there are 65 firms whose 
primary unionized employees switch from the AFL-CIO to the Change to Win Coalition 
in 2005 (e.g. Costco, where most union workers are in Teamsters unions).  Herein these 
firms are referred to as CTW-firms.  See Appendix A for further details on firm-union 
classification and data sources.   
 
3.3 Employer-Union Labor Strife 
I collect data on plant-level disputes between firm managers and labor unions that 
result in Unfair Labor Practice charges filed with the U.S. National Labor Relations 
Board.20  The agency maintains data on all NLRA violation (ULP) charges filed by both 
firms and labor unions.  Each charge is assigned a docket number specifying the labor 
union and firm involved in the dispute, the section of the NLRA in question, the filing 
date, and location of the conflict.  I collect all dockets involving each firm in the sample, 
from January 1, 2002 to September 30, 2006 (the latest date of ULP data availability).  
Because the majority of dockets cite the specific sections of the NLRA in dispute, I am 
able to categorize conflict as belonging to at least one of two groups.  First, I define 
collective bargaining conflict as any charge filed by labor unions against firms in 
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.  Section 8(a)(5) states that employers cannot 
refuse to bargain collectively with employee representatives.  Second, I define 
unionization conflict as any charge issued by firms against labor unions in violation of 
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA.  Section 8(b)(1)(A) stipulates that labor unions cannot 
coerce employees into either joining or avoiding a labor union.  See Appendix B for a 
more detailed description of each section of the NLRA and the data collection process. 
 Table 3 contains descriptive statistics summarizing the charges of Unfair Labor 
Practices at sample firms in 2002.21  I define strife at a firm as a binary indicator of 
whether there is any unfair labor practice charge related to collective bargaining or union 
member recruiting involving the firm in 2002.22  There are a total of 94 AFL-CIO-firms 
which experience unionization conflict in 2002, while there are 29 CTW-firms which 
                                                 
20 NLRB data is compiled by the Research Associates of America (RAA).     
21 The choice of using 2002 data rather than 2003-2006 data on unfair labor practices is explained in 
Section 4.4. 
22 This measure of labor strife is equivalent to an above or below the median measure of strife, as the 
median number of each type of charge in 2002 is 0. 
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experience disputes involving unionization in 2002.  Similarly, there are 65 AFL-CIO-
firms involved in collective bargaining strife while there are 25 CTW-firms involved in 
bargaining disputes.  There are two important facts presented in the table.  First, there 
does not appear to be any significant difference between the likelihood of observing a 
dispute involving unionization or collective bargaining at any given firm associated with 
either the AFL-CIO or the CTW coalition.  Second, the two types of disputes characterize 
distinct group of firms, as the correlation measures of both dispute types are below .6 for 
each set of unionized firms.   
 
Section 4: Analysis 
4.1 Natural Experiment Design and Sample 
There are several aspects of the identification strategy that are investigated in the 
data.  First, because of the size and diversity of unions which disaffiliate from the AFL-
CIO, the number of firms in which workers change union representation provides 
significant variation in the AFL-CIO’s labor relations.  Second, causal accounts of the 
AFL-CIO’s breakup suggest that changes in worker representation are likely independent 
of changes in firm or director characteristics, thus allowing for clean identification of the 
AFL-CIO funds’ labor objectives across companies (Chaison 2007).     
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics of firms held by the AFL-CIO funds at the 
end of 2004 and 2005, around the breakup of the labor organization.  Each column 
contains mean characteristics of firms grouped by affiliations of their unionized workers.  
These groups are: non-unionized companies, AFL-CIO-firms, and CTW-firms.  Variables 
are defined as in Table 2.   
Columns 1 and 2 indicate that in 2005 there are 140 sample firms whose 
unionized workers belong to the AFL-CIO during the entire sample period and 53 sample 
firms whose workers switch from the AFL-CIO to the CTW.  The number of firms 
associated with each union group is similar to that of 2004.  In 2005, the average market 
value of equity of AFL-CIO-firms is approximately $32 billion while the average market 
value of equity of CTW-firms is $23 billion.  Both types of union firms have similar 
production technologies, as measured by capital intensity.  The ratio of 2005 PPE to 
Assets in AFL-CIO-firms is 0.32 while the ratio is 0.30 for CTW-firms.  In each year, 
there are no significant differences at the 10% level in the market value of equity, number 
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of employees, capital intensity, ROA, or asset growth between AFL-CIO-firms and 
CTW-firms.23  Additionally, the average changes in these firm characteristics from 2004 
to 2005 are also statistically indistinguishable at the 10% level between the two types of 
union firms.  In results not reported here, between nonunion and unionized firms, there 
are statistical differences at the 10% level in Assets.  In 2005, non-union firms had an 
average value of $94 billion in book assets while union firms had an average value of $40 
billion in book assets.  The difference in Assets is expected, however, since non-
unionized firms include banks and insurance companies – industries which traditionally 
manage higher levels of capital than industries where firms are typically unionized.     
 Although fundamentally untestable, this paper’s identification assumption is 
supported by the sample descriptive statistics in Table 4.  Approximately 26% of all 
unionized sample firms have workers who switch union representation from the AFL-
CIO to the CTW coalition.  Along many observable dimensions such as market equity, 
ROA, asset growth, employment figures and measures of capital input intensity, AFL-
CIO-firms are similar to CTW-firms before and after the formation of the CTW coalition.  
To the extent that these dimensions are correlated with unobservable firm and director 
characteristics, it is unlikely that there are significant, endogenous differences between 
the two types of unionized firms that are correlated with worker-union affiliation.24  
Perhaps more importantly, it is worth noting that differences in balance sheet 
characteristics across the two groups do not contradict the central identifying assumption 
if these characteristics are uncorrelated with factors that affect proxy votes, such as 
unobservable director quality25.  In support of this claim, I find that there are no 
significant differences-in-differences between the balance sheet characteristics of AFL-
CIO-firms and CTW-firms around the breakup of the AFL-CIO.  In summary, any 
changes in the AFL-CIO funds’ voting behavior in response to the union reorganization 
                                                 
23 Additionally, in Table 3, statistics on Unfair Labor Practices suggest there are no significant differences 
in the likelihood that an AFL-CIO firm or a CTW-firm is involved in a labor dispute involving unionization 
or collective bargaining conflict in 2002.   
24 The identification assumption is more strongly supported by mutual fund voting evidence presented in 
Section 4.3, where both observable and unobservable factors affecting director quality and shareholder 
value are taken into account. 
25 For example, Table 4 suggests that firms in the CTW sample are more likely to belong to industries with 
an SIC code of 61-100 while AFL-CIO constant firms are more likely to belong to industries with SIC 
codes of 21-40.  Differences in industries, however, are not contrary to the identification assumption, as it 
is unlikely that static differences in industries correspond to dynamic changes in unobservable director 
quality for CTW firms relative to AFL-CIO-firms.  
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are likely to reflect the AFL-CIO’s labor interests rather than their shareholder value-
maximizing objectives.  It is also worth noting that the differences in Assets between 
union and non-union companies suggest there could be endogenous differences in firm or 
director characteristics between union and non-union firms.  However, these differences 
do not detract from the empirical strategy because the identification relies on changes in 
the AFL-CIO funds’ voting behavior within unionized firms as a function of variation in 
worker-union representation – not on changes in voting patterns between unionized 
versus non-unionized firms.26   
 
4.2 Changes in AFL-CIO Voting Behavior 
Figure 1 depicts the voting behavior of the AFL-CIO across 3 groups of firms— 
non-unionized companies, AFL-CIO-firms, and CTW-firms.27  Each pair of columns 
shows the percentage of votes cast against director nominees across all shareholder 
elections in each group of firms before and after the formation of the CTW coalition on 
September 27, 2005.28  The AFL-CIO votes against approximately 31% of all directors at 
non-unionized companies, while it votes against approximately 44% of all AFL-CIO-
firms.  For each of these two groups of firms, the voting patterns are similar before and 
after the formation of the CTW coalition.  T-tests indicate insignificant differences at the 
10% level in the percentages of votes cast for directors before and after the CTW 
formation.  However, the contemporaneous difference in voting patterns between non-
union and AFL-CIO-firms is statistically significant at the 1% level as standard errors are 
less than 2.5% in each column.  This difference suggests that the AFL-CIO funds’ 
director votes are affected by the AFL-CIO’s labor relations.  It is also possible, however, 
that this difference could reflect endogenous disparities in director quality between the 
two groups (as discussed in the Section 4.1).29  
The rightmost pair of columns in Figure 1 illustrates the changes in AFL-CIO 
fund votes for directors of CTW-firms.  Prior to the formation of the CTW coalition, the 
                                                 
26 This claim is supported by the results being robust to the exclusion of bank and insurance companies 
(which have higher asset values) from the sample. 
27 Estimates are also provided in Table 5, Panel A. 
28 The Change to Win coalition was officially formed in its founding convention on September 27, 2005.  I 
use this date to demarcate an unambiguous change in labor relations between the AFL-CIO and CTW 
unions.   
29 For example, firms with greater assets may attract higher quality directors who receive greater voting 
support from AFL-CIO funds.   
 18
AFL-CIO funds vote against 45% of all director nominees.  The voting patterns of the 
AFL-CIO funds at CTW-firms prior to September 27, 2005 mirror the funds’ 
contemporaneous voting patterns at AFL-CIO-firms.  T-tests reveal insignificant 
differences at the 10% level in the percentages of ‘For’ votes between the CTW-firms 
and AFL-CIO-firms before AFL-CIO breakup.  After the union realignment however, the 
AFL-CIO funds vote against only 29% of all directors at CTW-firms.30  This represents a 
significant increase (at the 1% level) in support for directors.  
Figure 1 and Panel A of Table 5 do not capture the effects of additional covariates 
that may influence the AFL-CIO’s proxy voting behavior.  These factors are incorporated 
by estimating a difference-in-difference OLS linear probability model.31  The baseline 
specification is: 
 
VoteMgtijt = α + β1(CTWj × Postt) + β2(CTWj) + β3(Postt) + β4(Unionj) +  
                   β4(Unionj × Postt) +  β5(StockReturnjt) + β6(StockReturnjt × Postt) +             
                  β7(Yeart) + β8(Firmj) + εijt 
 
 
(1) 
 
 
where subscripts ijt uniquely identify individual observations for nominee i, firm j, and 
time t.  VoteMgtijt is a binary indicator for whether the AFL-CIO votes against firm j 
management’s recommendation for director i at time t.  CTWj is an indicator for whether 
firm j’s unionized workers switch from the AFL-CIO to the Change to Win Coalition.  
Postt indicates whether the election at time t takes place after the formation of the CTW 
coalition.  Unionj is an indicator for whether firm j has any unionized workers at all.  
StockReturnjt is a potentially endogenous control for firm performance.  StockReturnjt is 
the market-adjusted stock return for firm j over the year preceding time t, normalized by 
the standard deviation of the stock’s historical annual excess returns (essentially the 
firm’s Sharpe ratio during the preceding year).  Year and firm fixed effects are denoted 
by Yeart, Firmj, respectively.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by election.32  The results are presented in Table 5, Panel B.     
                                                 
30 The difference in support for directors at CTW- firms versus non-union firms after the AFL-CIO breakup 
could be attributed to endogenous differences in director quality between unionized and non-unionized 
firms, as discussed in Section 4.1. 
31 See Card and Krueger (1994) for a good example of difference-in-difference estimation techniques.   
32 The results are robust to more aggregate levels of clustering such as grouping by firm.  See Petersen 
(2007) for further reference on clustering standard errors in corporate finance datasets.   
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 Column 1 indicates that on average, AFL-CIO funds are 11% more likely to vote 
against directors of unionized firms than non-unionized firms.  The estimated effect of 
the change in union affiliation on the director votes of the AFL-CIO funds is β1 of 
Columns 2-4.  Column 2 presents the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of 
labor relations on AFL-CIO fund votes in director elections for the full sample of firms. 
In contrast to Panel A, controls are added for time trends and cross-sectional differences 
in votes for directors of firms with different union relations (Post and CTW, respectively).    
The β1 estimate of -0.179 indicates that the AFL-CIO funds become 17.9% more 
supportive of director nominees of CTW-firms after the formation of the CTW coalition.  
This estimate is significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient of CTW is 0.024 while the 
coefficient of Post is -.001.  Neither coefficient is significant at the 10% level.  The 
statistical insignificance of the estimated coefficients for the two controls, CTW and Post, 
is consistent with the hypothesis that the AFL-CIO funds do not alter their general proxy 
voting policies as a result of the CTW formation and the hypothesis that the AFL-CIO 
funds have similar cross-sectional voting patterns at AFL-CIO-firms and CTW-firms 
before the CTW formation.  Column 3 adds year and firm fixed effects and Column 4 
adds stock return covariates to control for changes in stock performance.33  In all 
specifications, the data indicate that AFL-CIO funds are at least 14% to 18% more likely 
to vote for a firm’s director nominees once the AFL-CIO no longer represents the firm’s 
unionized workers.  The results are significant at the 5% level and robust to a variety of 
alternative specifications. 34  For example, the magnitude and significance of β1 is not 
sensitive to the inclusion of additional covariates such as firm balance sheet 
characteristics (even though these characteristics are endogenous) and the interactions of 
these characteristics with Post.  Furthermore, the analysis of a probit specification rather 
than a linear probability model yields similar conclusions.  
 There are two significant patterns in the data.  First, the AFL-CIO funds are more 
likely to vote against directors of AFL-CIO-firms than directors of non-unionized firms.  
                                                 
33 Although endogenous, stock performance covariates do not significantly affect the magnitude of the 
difference-in-difference estimates.  I include this covariate to address the hypothesis that AFL-CIO fund 
director votes are exclusively a function of past stock performance; the data suggest that even the inclusion 
of this endogenous variable as a regressor does not significantly impact the treatment effect estimates. 
34 It is also worth noting that the inclusion of firm fixed effects does little to affect the treatment effect 
estimates, even though firm fixed effects eliminate cross-sectional information that would otherwise lead to 
more precise treatment estimates.   
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Second, when workers disaffiliate from the AFL-CIO, the AFL-CIO funds become 
significantly more supportive of a company’s board candidates.  This suggests that the 
AFL-CIO funds’ voting decisions are affected by the AFL-CIO’s labor relations across 
firms.  
 
4.3 Voting Behavior of Non-AFL-CIO Affiliated Institutions 
 4.3.1 Mutual Funds 
The identification assumption central to the causal interpretation of the 
relationship between firm-union labor relations and union pension fund proxy voting is 
that changes in workers’ union affiliations are independent of unobservable factors which 
may otherwise influence the AFL-CIO funds’ proxy votes.  Although the identification 
assumption is ultimately untestable, there are several pieces of evidence which appear 
consistent with the assumption.  First, as discussed in Section 4.1, this assumption is 
motivated by the causes for the AFL-CIO’s breakup (Chaison 2007).  Second, the 
descriptive statistics in Table 4 indicate that there are no significant differences in many 
observable characteristics of AFL-CIO-firms and CTW-firms.  Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, the identification assumption is also investigated by comparison of the AFL-
CIO funds’ proxy votes with other large institutional investors such as mutual funds.   
Mutual funds are large institutions that have incentives to monitor the 
unobservable characteristics of firms and directors in their portfolios and use this 
information to cast director votes to maximize shareholder value (Shleifer and Vishny 
1986, Zeckhauser and Pound 1990, and Black 1992).35  Additionally, the presence of 
institutional investors at sample firms is likely to further induce directors to pursue 
shareholder value maximization (Allen, Bernardo, Welch 2000).  For example, 
institutional ownership may encourage directors to nominate high-quality candidates to 
the board.  If there are changes occurring at the firm or director level which are correlated 
with worker-union affiliation and shareholder value (observable or unobservable), then 
mutual funds would likely exhibit changes in voting patterns similar to those of the AFL-
CIO.   
                                                 
35 Each mutual fund produces its own set of proxy voting guidelines (available online), in which they state 
that their primary objective is maximizing the return for their shareholders.  See, for example, Fidelity’s 
proxy voting guidelines, available at: 
http://personal.fidelity.com/myfidelity/InsideFidelity/InvestExpertise/governance.shtml.tvsr 
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I estimate specification (1) for each of three mutual fund family index funds: the 
Fidelity Spartan Total Market Index Fund, the Vanguard Institutional Total Stock Market 
Index Fund, and the TIAA-CREF Equity Index Fund.  These funds are chosen because of 
their broad stock coverage and because the voting patterns for these funds are 
representative of the votes cast by other funds in the same families – both actively and 
passively managed funds (Rothberg and Lilien, 2005).  VoteMgtijt is now an indicator for 
whether the mutual fund votes against firm j management’s recommendation for nominee 
i at time t.  All other covariates remain the same as in Table 5, Panel B.  In Table 6, for 
each mutual fund I present two sets of regression estimates, each corresponding to the 
two leftmost columns of Table 5, Panel B.  This particular version of the specification 
estimates the largest effect of the change in union affiliation for the AFL-CIO funds’ 
director votes in Panel B of Table 5.   
First, Columns 1, 3, and 5 indicate that mutual funds are on average more likely to 
vote for directors of firms with unionized workers, in contrast to the AFL-CIO funds.  
This suggests that unionization is not associated with unobservable, low director quality.  
Second, as indicated in Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 6, none of the three mutual funds 
significantly alter their director votes in response to changes in worker-union 
representation.  In all cases, β1 is of small absolute magnitude and is statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level.  The least insignificant coefficient is -0.056 for Vanguard.  
However, even if this coefficient were statistically different from 0, the magnitude of this 
estimate is much smaller than the -0.179 estimate for the AFL-CIO fund votes.36  The 
mutual fund estimates are similar with the exclusion of union firms from the sample and 
the inclusion of other controls for stock performance, firm characteristics, etc., following 
the specifications of Table 5.  Clustering standard errors by firm and correcting for 
heteroskedasticity further increases the size of standard errors and thus reduces the 
significance of the coefficients.  I also estimate the mutual fund voting response to the 
CTW formation using mutual fund voting data from January 1, 2004 onwards to check 
for any bias resulting from the relatively greater number of total director votes cast at 
firms which hold annual elections after June (as the 2003 mutual fund voting data starts 
                                                 
36 It is also worth noting that the statistical significance of other coefficients in Column 4, such as Post, 
indicate that the magnitude of β1 is likely overestimated due to omitted variables bias, such as a Vanguard-
specific change in voting policy over time.   
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in July, 2003).  However, even for this subsample, mutual funds do not significantly 
increase their support for directors at CTW-firms after September 27, 2005.   
If the change in the AFL-CIO funds’ voting behavior at CTW-firms is a 
shareholder value maximizing response to changes occurring at the firm or director level 
for those CTW-companies, then it is reasonable to expect mutual funds to vote in a 
similar manner.  However, the data indicate that mutual funds do not vote like the AFL-
CIO; they are more likely to vote for directors of unionized firms than AFL-CIO funds 
and they do not alter their voting patterns in response to changes in the AFL-CIO’s 
internal organization.  These patterns suggest there are no simultaneous, unobservable 
changes in firm or director characteristics affecting equity value, consistent with the 
empirical strategy’s central identification assumption.  
 
4.3.2 Brotherhood of Carpenters Labor Union Pension Funds 
I also compare the AFL-CIO funds’ voting behavior with the votes cast by the 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America in many of their pension funds.  
The UBCJA, which was not part of the AFL-CIO from 2001 to 2005, joined the Change 
to Win Coalition in its 2005 inception37.  The union manages many affiliated local 
chapter funds and casts proxy votes uniformly across their holdings.  The funds studied 
here are on the order of $20 billion in investment.  The UBCJA pension funds serve as an 
important group to compare with the AFL-CIO funds.  UBCJA funds are activist labor 
union pension funds that do not have the same labor relations with firms as the AFL-CIO 
funds; the UBCJA is independent of any large union affiliation for the sample pre-period 
of January 1, 2003 to September 27, 2005, however UBCJA funds have labor relations 
with CTW-firms after the UBCJA joins the CTW coalition  
Columns 7-8 presents the UBCJA fund voting estimates for the same empirical 
specification estimated for mutual funds, where VoteMgtijt is now an indicator for 
whether the UBCJA funds vote for nominee i in firm j at time t.38  Column 7 indicates 
that UBJCA funds are 8.1% more likely to support directors of unionized firms than 
                                                 
37 That is, the UBCJA is independent of any large union affiliation for the sample pre-period of January 1, 
2003 to September 27, 2005.   
38 I define VoteMgtijt = 0 if the UBCJA data sample states they vote explicitly ‘for’ a director, and 
VoteMgtijt = 1 otherwise. For 31 elections in the UBCJA sample, the votes cast for all directors in the 
election are listed as ‘split’.  For each director in these elections, I define VoteMgtijt = .5.   The results are 
similar if these elections are removed from the sample or if I define VoteMgtijt = 1.   
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directors of nonunionized firms.  Column 8 indicates that UBCJA pension funds become 
21.7% more opposed to director nominees of CTW-firms after the UBCJA joins the 
CTW Coalition.    Additionally, the estimates in Columns 7 and 8 are robust to the 
inclusion of year and firm fixed effects and stock performance controls.   
The UBCJA funds’ voting behavior supports two points.  First, the UBCJA funds’ 
behavior is similar to the AFL-CIO funds’ behavior to the extent that director votes 
appear to be affected by union-firm labor relations.  When the AFL-CIO is no longer 
affiliated with workers at sample firms, AFL-CIO pension funds appear to become more 
supportive of director nominees.  In a sample where the UBCJA is mostly independent of 
larger union affiliation, the UBCJA pension funds are on average more likely to support 
directors of firms with unionized employees than directors of nonunionized firms.  
However, when the UBCJA begins affiliating with union workers of CTW-firms, the 
UBCJA pension funds become significantly more opposed to director nominees at these 
companies.  The findings indicate that the potential impact of labor relations on the 
director votes of union pension funds is not simply limited to pension funds affiliated 
with the AFL-CIO, but rather is applicable to other union pension funds as well.  Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, the lack of a negative estimate for the interaction term in 
Column 8 support the validity of this paper’s central identifying assumption: changes in 
firm employee-union affiliation are independent of unobservable characteristics which 
affect shareholder value and hence proxy votes.   
 
4.4 Voting Impact of Plant-Level Conflict Between Labor Unions and Management  
I estimate the added AFL-CIO fund voting impact of plant-level disputes between 
labor unions and management during union recruitment and collective bargaining and 
find that the AFL-CIO funds’ voting behavior reflects union worker interests.  The 
empirical specification of the previous section is broadened to incorporate labor strife.  
Correspondingly, the added identification assumption is that labor strife is uncorrelated 
with unobserved firm or director level attributes that affect shareholder value39.  The 
baseline regression is a triple difference-in-difference OLS linear probability model40:  
 
                                                 
39 This assumption is discussed in greater detail below. 
40 See Gruber (1994) for an example of triple difference-in-difference econometrics.   
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VoteMgtijt = α + β1(Strifej × CTWj × Postt) + β2(CTWj × Postt) +  
                    β3(CTWj × Strifej) + β4(Strifej × Postt) + β5(Strifej) + β6(CTWj) +  
                   β7(Postt) + β8(Unionj) + β9(Unionj × Postt) + β10(Unionj × Strifej) +   
                   β11(Unionj × Strifej × Postt) + β12(StockReturnjt) + β13(StockReturnjt ×  
                   Postt) + β14(Yeart) + β15(Firmj) + εijt 
 
 
 
(2)
 
 
  
where subscripts ijt uniquely identify individual observations for nominee i, firm j, and 
time t.   
I define two unique proxies for labor strife at the firm level.  Strifej (unionization) 
is a binary indicator of whether any Unfair Labor Practice charges were raised by firm j 
against a labor union for unlawful attempts at strengthening union membership at firm j 
in 2002.  Strifej (collective bargaining) is a binary indicator of whether any Unfair Labor 
Practice charges were filed by a labor union against firm j for refusing to bargain 
collectively with worker representatives in 2002.  Firms where Strife = 1 are assumed to 
have greater frequency of conflict between labor unions and managers than firms where 
Strife = 0.  Data on charges from 2002, as opposed to data from the sample years 2003 to 
2006, are used to more plausibly satisfy the added identification assumption that 
measures of labor strife are independent of unobservable firm or director characteristics 
which are correlated with shareholder value and hence proxy votes.41  All other 
covariates in Equation (2) remain as defined in Equation (1).  Standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and clustered by election.42   
 The coefficients of primary interest are β5 and β1.  β5 is a measure of the impact of 
labor strife on the AFL-CIO’s director votes.  β1 is a measure of how the sensitivity of 
director votes to labor strife changes at firms in which workers disaffiliate from the AFL-
CIO.  The null hypothesis is that the AFL-CIO’s voting sensitivity to labor strife is 
uninfluenced by an exogenous change in the union affiliation of workers involved in 
management disputes.  Included are controls for general time trends, cross-sectional and 
within-firm differences in AFL-CIO votes.  There are also controls for interaction terms. 
                                                 
41 As illustrated in table 3, the relative frequency of labor conflict involving either unionization or 
collective bargaining is the same within each group of unionized sample firms.   Additionally, pre-sample 
measures of labor conflict are used because pre-sample conflict is less likely to be endogenous with proxy 
votes cast during 2003-2006 than contemporaneous measures of labor conflict (as well as other firm 
characteristics, such as shareholders’ private information, as discussed in Section 4.5.2).  However, it is 
worth noting that the results are also robust to using 2003-2006 data on ULP.        
42 The results are robust to clustering standard errors by firm.  
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For example, CTW × Post controls for the average effect of changes in worker-union 
affiliation on the AFL-CIO’s votes.  Tables 7 and 8 contain the regression results for each 
type of labor conflict.   
 
4.4.1 Unionization Conflict 
 Table 7 presents estimates of unionization strife on the AFL-CIO funds’ director 
votes.  The univariate regression of Column 1 shows the AFL-CIO funds are 17.7% more 
likely to vote against directors at firms with unionization conflict in 2002 than at firms 
with no such disagreements.  While this estimate suggests that the AFL-CIO funds have 
workers’ interests in mind when proxy voting (they may vote against directors to express 
disapproval at management’s interference with union recruiting efforts), this estimate 
could also reflect the AFL-CIO funds’ desire to limit labor conflict that they believe is 
equity value-decreasing (they may use their votes to hasten the removal of directors who 
allow costly disputes to occur at the firm).  
To distinguish these two hypotheses, Columns 2-5 presents estimates of how the 
sensitivity of proxy votes to labor strife changes at firms whose workers join the CTW 
coalition.  If union-management conflict is costly to investors and the AFL-CIO is solely 
interested in maximizing shareholder value, then the union affiliation of workers involved 
with management disputes should not matter.  However, the null hypothesis that β1 is 0 is 
rejected by the data.  Columns 2-3 indicate that the impact of changing union affiliation is 
especially strong when the sample of firms is restricted to companies characterized by 
labor strife.  The treatment effect estimate of changing union affiliation is between -.310 
and -.330.  Columns 4-5 compare (approximately) the treatment effect estimates of 
changing union affiliation on AFL-CIO proxy votes for subsamples of high versus low 
strife firms.  An increase in unionization strife at a firm is associated with a higher 
probability of voting against the firm’s directors, however, when the firm’s workers 
disaffiliate from the AFL-CIO, the probability of voting against directors decreases by 
32%-33%.  In other words, the impact of worker-union affiliation on AFL-CIO proxy 
votes is particularly relevant for firms where management-worker relations are tenuous.   
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4.4.2 Collective Bargaining Conflict 
 Table 8 presents estimates of collective bargaining strife on the AFL-CIO funds’ 
director votes.  The univariate regression of Column 1 indicates that AFL-CIO funds are 
13.9% more likely to vote against directors at firms involved in collective bargaining 
disputes than for nominees at firms without comparable disagreements.  This figure 
suggests that the AFL-CIO funds may vote against directors to express disapproval at 
their handling of contract negotiations.  However, this figure could also reflect equity 
value-maximizing behavior if union funds believe contract negotiations should run 
smoothly to increase shareholder value.   
To distinguish these motivations, Columns 2-5 present estimates of the changing 
sensitivity of votes to bargaining strife at CTW-firms.  Columns 2-3 indicate that when 
the sample of firms is restricted to companies with conflict involving contract 
negotiations, the impact of changing labor relations on AFL-CIO proxy votes is 
particularly strong.  The AFL-CIO funds become at least 21% more likely to support 
directors of firms where workers switch union affiliation primarily from the AFL-CIO to 
the CTW Coalition.  These estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Columns 4-5 indicate that the change in union affiliation is not significantly different for 
subsamples of firms with high and low levels of contract strife.  That is, the null 
hypothesis that β1 is 0 is not rejected by the data.  This estimate suggests that the impact 
of changing union affiliation is not significantly stronger in the high strife subsample of 
firms compared to the low strife subsample of firms.43  However, it is possible that firms 
characterized by low levels of collective bargaining strife could be subject to other types 
of labor conflict, which may explain why the impact of changing union affiliation is 
significant for firms with both high and low collective bargaining strife.44 
Collective bargaining and unionization strife measures capture two distinct 
dimensions of conflict that arise between labor unions and firm managers.  Using each 
measure of labor conflict, I find that the AFL-CIO funds vote against directors more 
often when unions are involved in disputes with management.  These voting patterns do 
not appear to reflect shareholder value-maximizing behavior, as the opposition to 
directors is primarily limited to firms in which the AFL-CIO represents workers.  Instead, 
                                                 
43 It is possible that the additional restrictions imposed in the specifications for Columns 4-5 relative to 
Columns 2-3 cause measures of β1 to be underestimated. 
44 This claim is supported by the findings in Table 7. 
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the AFL-CIO voting behavior is consistent with the hypothesis that the AFL-CIO funds 
oppose directors partly as a means of supporting union workers who face opposition from 
management during collective bargaining and union recruiting efforts.       
 
4.5 Alternative Hypotheses 
 I explore the relevance of alternative explanations for the evidence.  The results 
do not appear to be driven by bias resulting from AFL-CIO portfolio selection decisions 
or from changes in private information available to the AFL-CIO funds that may have 
resulted from the union reorganization.  Additionally, it is unlikely that the findings are 
explained by the potential endogeneity of proxy voting decisions and union 
reorganization.  
 
4.5.1 Portfolio Selection Bias 
One alternative explanation of the findings is that the AFL-CIO funds’ voting 
behavior is the result of endogenous stock selection for the AFL-CIO’s funds.  For 
example, in response to the changes in the AFL-CIO’s structure, it is possible that the 
AFL-CIO funds choose to invest in CTW-firms where it is value-maximizing to support 
directors differentially more than previous years’ holdings.  Table 9 presents descriptive 
statistics summarizing the turnover of stocks in the AFL-CIO funds’ portfolios.  Because 
of the limited length of the time series, it is difficult to measure precisely how turnover 
may contribute to the change in voting.  However, the data indicate that the turnover in 
2006 does not appear to be significantly different from previous years.  More 
specifically, stock holdings of either AFL-CIO-firms or CTW-firms do not seem to 
fluctuate in the immediate year following the AFL-CIO’s reorganization relative to 
earlier years.  I also estimate specification (1) and (2) for a subsample of firms that 
appear in the AFL-CIO’s portfolio in 2005 and 2006, dropping stocks which are not 
present in both years.  The results are robust for this sample.45  Overall, it is unlikely that 
the estimated effects of labor relations and worker interests are driven by the inclusion of 
new securities in 2006 or the removal of stocks from 2005 holdings.   
 
                                                 
45 Furthermore, the year and firm fixed effects specification in Table 5, Panel B largely reduces any 
potential bias resulting from cross-sectional stock additions and subtractions from the fund holdings.   
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4.5.2 Asymmetric Information 
 Another alternative explanation of the evidence is that the union reorganization 
caused the AFL-CIO funds to lose private information on director attributes after they 
stopped associating with workers of CTW-firms.  This hypothesis, however, is not 
supported by the triple difference estimates of the voting effects of labor strife and union 
relations.  First, measures of labor strife in 2002 are unlikely to be correlated with 
changes in information occurring in 2005.  Second, instances of labor strife during 
collective bargaining and union recruitment are generally public knowledge (this paper 
utilizes publicly available data from the U.S. NLRB to characterize labor disputes).  
Third, the coefficient of CTW × Post in Columns 4-5 of Tables 7 and 8 indicates the 
average effect of changing union affiliation is statistically insignificant at the 10% level.  
If the findings were driven by information changes rather than worker interests, this 
coefficient should be significantly negative while the coefficient of Strife × CTW × Post 
should be 0.  Evidence to the contrary implies that the results reflect worker interests 
rather than changes in private information.   
 
4.5.4 Endogenous Timing of AFL-CIO Fund Voting and CTW Formation 
A third alternative explanation for the evidence is that the AFL-CIO was simply 
becoming more supportive of CTW-firms over time, and that the formation of the CTW 
was driven by the changing attitude of the AFL-CIO’s leaders (and the AFL-CIO 
pension fund managers) towards the management of firms with CTW employees.  This 
hypothesis is not supported by the data, however.   First, there is no pre-period trend in 
the AFL-CIO voting patterns for CTW-firms; in 2003 and 2004, the AFL-CIO funds 
vote against directors of CTW-firms approximately 50% of the time in each year (the 
differences between the two years are not statistically significant).  Starting in 2005, 
however, when conflict starts to arise among union leaders within the AFL-CIO 
(Chaison, 2007), the AFL-CIO becomes significantly more supportive of directors of 
CTW-firms.  Second, the evidence that the UBCJA funds become significantly less 
supportive of directors at CTW-firms after the joining the CTW Coalition is unrelated to 
any endogenous timing of AFL-CIO voting patterns and union reorganization; rather, the 
evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that union pension fund proxy votes are 
affected by union labor relations.   
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Section 5: Conclusion 
This paper presents evidence that suggests some labor union shareholders have 
board of director voting patterns that partly reflect union worker interests rather than the 
objectives of maximizing equity value alone.  I examine the proxy votes of AFL-CIO 
pension funds at 504 corporations before and after the breakup of the AFL-CIO into two 
organizations.  The AFL-CIO funds become significantly more supportive of director 
nominees at firms where the AFL-CIO no longer represents workers or represents 
significantly fewer workers due to the union reorganization.  Additionally, while the 
union funds vote against directors more often at companies where there are plant-level 
disputes between labor unions and management during union recruiting and collective 
bargaining, the sensitivity of director votes to labor disputes decreases significantly at 
firms where the AFL-CIO no longer represents workers or represents significantly fewer 
workers.   
 The findings illustrate that shareholders may have heterogeneous preferences, in 
contrast to canonical models of shareholder objectives.  The results also contribute to 
debate over capital market reforms by underscoring the relevance of disparate investor 
goals.  It is important to understand the potential impact of diverse shareholder interests 
when evaluating regulations that increase equity investor powers, particularly with regard 
to the proxy voting process.  Finally, the results point to interesting avenues for further 
research.  
This paper depicts director elections as a channel through which labor union 
pension funds may pursue worker interests.  Recent union shareholder activism against 
the executive compensation packages and dual class share structures of unionized firms 
suggests that there are additional corporate governance mechanisms through which 
organized workers attempt to reap gains.  This activism engenders the need for standard 
models of corporate governance to incorporate the role of workers.  It is likely that labor 
plays a critical part in determining governance arrangements as well as allocating total 
surplus amongst the firm’s various stakeholders.  
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Appendix A: 
Union Relations 
I construct estimates of employee-union affiliation across all sample firms using a 
variety of publicly available sources.  There is no centralized, publicly available database 
containing information on firm employee-union associations; I consult data sources that 
have been used by previous researchers (Dinardo and Lee, 2004, Cutcher-Gershenfeld 
and Kochan 2004, Gomez and Tzioumis 2007 are recent examples).   
First, I search the 2006 10-K filings for each company in the AFL-CIO portfolios.  
Some firms do not have 2006 10-K’s, due to mergers, acquisitions, or exchange rules; for 
these firms, I rely on the most recent 10-K available (prior to 2006).  If no 10-K is 
available, I consult the 2006 or most recent annual report prior to 2006 released by the 
firm itself (available online or through investor relations departments).  If the 10-K or 
equivalent annual report explicitly states that none of the U.S. fulltime equivalent 
workers in the firm belong to a union or are subject to a collective bargaining agreement, 
I categorize the firm as ‘non-union’.   
If the 10-K does not explicitly state that a firm’s domestic workers are non-
unionized, I then consult the U.S. FMCS listing of F-7 notices from January, 2003 to 
December, 2006 to identify expiring union contracts.  This data is available through a 
Freedom of Information Act request.  For each company in the AFL-CIO sample, I 
search for the company name under the ‘Employer’ field in each F-7 notice.  I check the 
industry description in the F-7 filing with the SIC code and industry description of the 
firm in the 10-K and verify that the F-7 notice is not identifying spurious firm names or 
contracts for firm subcontractors.  Then, for each company with F-7 notices, I identify the 
total number of workers associated with AFL-CIO affiliated unions and CTW affiliated 
unions.  The union name and size of the bargaining unit associated with each firm is 
available in the F-7 notice.  For each firm, I sum the numbers of workers in bargaining 
units associated with each labor organization.  If the percentage of workers belonging to 
unions associated with the CTW coalition is greater than 90%, I categorize the firm as 
CTW; otherwise if at least 10% of the workers belong to an AFL-CIO union, the firm is 
categorized as AFL-CIO.   
Some firms explicitly state which unions are associated with their workers in the 
10-K; if no FMCS filings are available for these firms, I rely on information in the 10-K’s 
to estimate union workforces.  Six firms (railroads and airlines) are not covered under the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which mandates that the FMCS must be notified 
of expiring union contracts.  Based on information in the 10-K’s and discussions with the 
firms’ investor relations departments, I categorize these firms as ‘AFL-CIO-firms’.  The 
results are similar if we exclude these six firms from the sample.   
If a firm does not explicitly state it has union workers and there are no F-7 notices 
associated with the firm from 2003-2006, I categorize the firm as ‘non-union’.  There are 
several firms which suggest in the 10-K’s that they employ union workers, however, I do 
not find an F-7 notice for these firms.  For this small subsample of firms, I consult 
additional sources to more precisely identify employee-union affiliation.  First, I look at 
FMCS filings for 2001-2007.  This yields F-7 notices for 4 companies; using the latest F-
7 notice available, I categorize the firm as AFL-CIO or CTW depending on the affiliation 
of the union described in the filing.  The findings are similar if these 4 firms are excluded 
from the sample.  For the remaining companies in the subsample, I then consult NLRB 
elections and petitions from 2001-2007 (limiting the search to elections with 20 workers 
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or more, following Dinardo and Lee 2004).  For 2 firms, this yields union information 
and hence union categorization.  The results are similar if we exclude these two firms 
from the sample.  Finally, I contact the investor relations departments for remaining 
firms, and was able to ascertain the union affiliation of workers at 4 firms: Affiliated 
Computer Services and VF Corporation, which are both categorized as CTW-firms, and 
Decoma and Magna International, which are both categorized as AFL-CIO-firms.  The 
results are similar if we exclude these 4 firms from the sample.   
There are several potential sources of measurement error, however, it is likely that 
this measurement error causes voting pattern estimates to understate the true impact of 
union worker interests on proxy voting.  First, FMCS data may be missing some unions 
or firms which do not comply with the legal requirements of the NLRA (leading to 
downward bias in union representation).  Second, I utilize U.S. government filings; I 
restrict the unionization estimates to include U.S. full-time equivalent employees who are 
unionized— not international workers who may belong to a labor union, since data on 
international unionization is not standardized across firms.  Third, for each company, I 
search the FMCS and NLRB filings using only the primary company name associated 
with the ticker symbol – not uniquely named subsidiaries for each firm.   Sometimes 
subsidiaries will be listed with alongside the parent company name in F-7 notices and this 
will be included in the dataset; other times a subsidiary will have a different name from 
the parent company and this will not be included in the dataset.  I assume that the F-7 
notices associated with a parent company are representative of the F-7 notices associated 
with a parent company and all of its subsidiaries.   
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Appendix B: 
NLRB Unfair Labor Practice data 
There are primarily two types of Unfair Labor Practices (ULP).  First, collective 
bargaining ULP’s are charges filed by labor unions against firms in violation of Section 
8(a)(5) of the NLRA, which stipulates that an employer cannot “refuse to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 
9(a)”, where section 9(a) reads: 
 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the 
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining 
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of 
employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have 
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances 
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the 
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective- bargaining contract or 
agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been 
given opportunity to be present at such adjustment. 
 
Second, unionization ULP’s are charge issued by firms against labor unions, in 
which labor unions are accused of engaging in illegal unionization practices (a violation 
of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA).  Specifically, Section 8(b)(1)(A) stipulates: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, that this 
paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with 
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; 
 
Section 7 states: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and 
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such 
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring 
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in 
section 8(a)(3). 
 
RAA maintains a database of all individual charges (dockets) filed with the 
NLRB from January, 1994 to September, 2006.  I search for the filings relevant to a 
particular firm by searching for the firm’s name in the ‘Employer’ field of each docket in 
the database.  If there are no unfair labor practices for a given firm, that firm is recorded 
as having 0 ULP.  I repeat this procedure for every firm in the sample.  I search amongst 
all ULP charges filed between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2002 for the strife 
measures used in this paper.   
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Table 1 
Proxy Voting Summary Statistics  
 This table presents descriptive statistics summarizing the sample shareholder elections 
and proxy voting behavior of various institutional investors.  Panel A depicts the AFL-CIO funds’ 
firm holdings and director elections in which they cast proxy votes. Firms (total) is the total 
number of firms held by the AFL-CIO funds in which the union funds participate in shareholder 
elections from Jan. 2003 to Dec. 2006.  Elections (total) is the total number of shareholder 
elections in the sample.  Director Nominees (avg. per election) is the average number of directors 
up for election at any given shareholder meeting.  Panel B summarizes the AFL-CIO funds’ 
voting behavior across the three most common election ballot items.  Stock Option Proposals 
refers to all stock option related proposals, while Auditor Approvals refers to proposals 
appointing firm auditors.  Panel C summarizes the matched director votes of each institutional 
investor with the AFL-CIO funds’ director votes.  In both Panel B and C, Number of votes is total 
number of sample votes cast during for each proposal type, and % Support is the percentage of 
institutional investor votes cast in favor of board vote recommendations to shareholders.   
 
 
Panel A: AFL-CIO Director Election Statistics 
 
Firms (total) 504 
Elections (total) 1,492 
Elections (avg. per yr) 373 
 
Director Nominees (total) 10,407 
Director Nominees (avg. per election) 6.98 
 
 
Panel B: AFL-CIO Election Ballot Items and Voting Statistics 
 
 Number of Votes          % Support 
   
Director Nominees 10,407 65% 
Stock Option Proposals 1,062 16% 
Auditor Approvals 1,332 38% 
 
 
Panel C: Institutional Investor Director Voting Statistics 
 
 
 
Fidelity Spartan Total Market Index Fund 
Number 
of Votes 
7,501 
% Support 
 
98% 
Vanguard Institutional Total Stock Market Index Fund 7,949 89% 
TIAA-CREF Institutional Equity Index Fund 7,805 93% 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America Pension Funds 
4,515 55% 
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Table 2 
Characteristics of Firms Held By AFL-CIO Funds (2003-2006) 
This table presents descriptive statistics summarizing the characteristics of all sample 
firms held by the AFL-CIO funds from 2003-2006 and the S&P 500.  Data is as of the end of 
2005 from Compustat, where available.  Assets ($Bil) is the book value of assets.  Equity ($Bil) is 
the market value of outstanding equity.  Leverage ($Bil) is the ratio of long term debt to book 
value of equity. EBITDA ($Bil) is Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization.  Capital Intensity is the ratio of PPE (net Plant, Property, and Equipment, in $Bil) 
to Assets.  Employees (Thousand) is the number of employees.  Industry (2 digit SIC) refers to 
industry grouping based on the 2 digit SIC code of firms.  It is the number of firms belonging to 
particular industry, as a percentage of total firms in the AFL-CIO fund holdings or the S&P 500 
used to calculate descriptive statistics for balance sheet information.  Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses.   
 
 AFL-CIO holdings S&P 500 
Assets 54.35 
(3.19) 
48.36 
(6.61) 
Equity 24.75 
(0.83) 
23.50 
(1.75) 
Leverage 0.84 
(0.07) 
0.92 
(0.20) 
Sales 16.97 
(0.60) 
15.98 
(1.35) 
EBITDA 3.48 
(0.14) 
3.39 
(0.32) 
Capital Intensity 0.26 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.01) 
Employees 48.28 
(1.87) 
46.54 
(4.57) 
Industry (2 digit SIC)   
0-20 10.4% 9.6% 
21-40 37.4% 39.6% 
41-60 28.3% 27.4% 
61-99 23.8% 23.4% 
Total Number of Sample Firms  504 500 
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Table 3 
Labor Relations and Unfair Labor Practices at Firms held by AFL-CIO Funds  
This table presents descriptive statistics summarizing union labor relations and Unfair 
Labor Practice (ULP) charges at all sample firms in 2002.  Each column refers to all firms within 
a particular group – AFL-CIO is the set of AFL-CIO-firms, CTW is the set of CTW-firms, Full 
Sample refers to all firms in the sample.  Total Firms is the total number of sample firms in each 
group.  Panels A and B summarize unionization and collective bargaining ULP charges, 
respectively.  Firms with >(=)0 Strife is the number of firms with more than (exactly) 0 ULP 
charges of each type in 2002.  Percentages of total firms within each group are indicated in 
parentheses.  Panel C summarizes all Collective Bargaining and Unionization ULP charges in 
2002.  Correlation of conflict measures is the correlation of 2002 collective bargaining and 
unionization ULP charge indicators at the firm level.   
 
 AFL-CIO CTW Full Sample 
Panel A: Unionization Conflict 
94 29 129 
Firms with >0 Strife 
(52%) (45%) (26%) 
87 36 375 
Firms with 0 Strife 
(48%) (55%) (74%) 
Panel B: Collective Bargaining Conflict 
65 25 92 
Firms with >0 Strife 
(36%) (38%) (18%) 
116 40 412 
Firms with 0 Strife 
(64%) (62%) (82%) 
Panel C: All Conflict 
Correlation of conflict 
measures 0.444 0.563 0.593 
Total Firms 181 65 504 
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Table 4 
Characteristics of Firms held by AFL-CIO Funds in 2004 and 2005 
This table presents descriptive statistics of characteristics of firms held by the AFL-CIO 
funds and firms in the S&P 500 at the end of the years before (2004) and after (2005) the 
formation of the CTW.  AFL-CIO fund firms are categorized into three groups – Non-union 
firms, AFL-CIO-firms, and CTW-firms.  Equity ($Bil) is the market value of outstanding equity.  
Capital Intensity is the ratio of PPE (net Plant, Property, and Equipment, in $Bil) to book value 
of assets ($Bil).  ROA is the ratio of EBITDA to market value of assets, where market value of 
assets is the sum of book value of assets plus the market value of equity, minus the sum of book-
valued equity and deferred taxes.  Employees is the total number of employees (Thousands).  
Asset growth is the ratio of book value of assets in current year to previous year.  2-digit SIC 
refers to percentage of each column’s firms in each 2-digit SIC industry group. Standard errors 
are in parentheses.   
 
2004 AFL-CIO CTW Non-union S&P 500 
Equity  30.24 
(4.25) 
23.96 
(5.96) 
29.43 
(3.36) 
22.70 
(1.80) 
Capital 
Intensity 
0.34 
(0.02) 
0.33 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.02) 
0.25 
(0.01) 
ROA 0.08 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
Employees 61.94 
(6.02) 
64.58 
(10.73) 
47.25 
(10.81) 
44.58 
(4.36) 
Asset Growth 
 
1.08 
(0.01) 
1.10 
(0.02) 
1.12 
(0.02) 
1.12 
(0.01) 
2-digit SIC     
0-20 10% 16% 12% 10% 
21-40 49% 29% 26% 40% 
41-60 31% 29% 29% 27% 
61-100 10% 25% 34% 23% 
# Firms 147 51 173 500 
2005     
Equity  32.06 
(4.44) 
23.43 
(5.61) 
30.12 
(3.29) 
23.50 
(1.75) 
Capital 
Intensity 
0.32 
(0.02) 
0.30 
(0.02) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.24 
(0.01) 
ROA 0.08 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.08 
(0.00) 
Employees 64.54 
(6.42) 
67.91 
(11.31) 
46.64 
(11.39) 
46.54 
(4.57) 
Asset Growth 
 
1.06 
(0.02) 
1.07 
(0.03) 
1.12 
(0.02) 
1.11 
(0.01) 
2-digit SIC     
0-20 11% 13% 12% 10% 
21-40 50% 30% 27% 40% 
41-60 28% 26% 28% 27% 
61-100 11% 30% 33% 22% 
# Firms 140 53 172 500 
Table 5 
Effects of Firm-Union Relations on AFL-CIO Funds’ Director Votes 
This table presents the difference-in-difference analysis and regression results of AFL-
CIO proxy votes for director nominees estimated as a function of firm-union workers’ affiliations.  
Panel A presents the fraction of votes cast against directors of firms that employ union workers 
primarily affiliated with either the AFL-CIO or the CTW Coalition (rows) before and after the 
formation of the CTW Coalition (columns).  ‘Difference’ refers to the differences in mean votes 
by row or column.  The bottom, rightmost cell contains the difference-in-difference estimate of 
proxy votes against directors.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  Panel B contains regression 
estimates for the baseline specification of the following OLS linear probability model:  
 
VoteMgtijt =  α + β1(CTWj × Postt) + β2(CTWj) + β3(Postt) + β4(Unionj) + β4(Unionj × Postt) +   
        β5(StockReturnjt) + β6(StockReturnjt × Postt) + β7(Yeart) + β8(Firmj) + εijt 
 
where subscripts ijt uniquely identify individual observations for nominee i, firm j, time t.  
VoteMgtijt = 1 (0) if the AFL-CIO votes against (for) firm j’s recommendation for nominee i at 
time t.  CTWj = 1 (0) if firm j is a CTW-firm.  Postt = 1 (0) if election takes place after (before) 
the CTW formation.  StockReturnjt is the market-adjusted stock return for firm j over the year 
preceding time t, normalized by the standard deviation of the stock’s past annual excess returns.  
Unionj = 1 (0) if firm has (no) unionized workers in either the AFL-CIO or CTW coalition.  Year 
and firm fixed effects are denoted by Yeart, Firmj, respectively.  Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by election. 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
 Pre-Period Post-Period Difference 
0.429 0.443 -0.014 AFL-CIO 
(0.009) (0.015) (0.024) 
0.452 0.287 0.165*** CTW 
(0.016) (0.022) (0.038) 
-0.024 0.156 -0.179*** Difference 
(0.025) (0.037) (0.062) 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 5 (continued):  
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
VoteMgt (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CTW × Post  -0.179** -0.144** -0.138** 
  (0.081) (0.063) (0.063) 
CTW  0.024   
  (0.045)   
Post  -0.001 0.097 0.064 
  (0.036) (0.086) (0.086) 
Union 0.111*** 0.114***   
 (0.024) (0.032)   
Union × Post  0.015 0.036 0.036 
  (0.061) (0.046) (0.046) 
Stock Return    0.007 
    (0.017) 
Stock Return × Post    -0.086* 
    (0.051) 
Constant 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.276*** 0.272*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.087) (0.088) 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Sample Firms All All All All 
# of Firms 504 504 504 503 
# of Observations 10,407 10,407 10,407 10,390 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Effects of Firm-Union Relations on Institutional Investors’ Director Votes 
This table presents the regression results of various institutional investors’ proxy votes for director nominees as a function of union-firm 
workers’ affiliations.  The baseline specification is an OLS linear probability model which, for each institutional investor, corresponds to the two 
leftmost columns of Table 5, Panel B:  
 
VoteMgtijt =  α + β1(CTWj × Postt) + β2(CTWj) + β3(Postt) + β4(Unionj) + β5(Unionj × Postt) + εijt 
 
where subscripts ijt uniquely identify individual observations for nominee i, firm j, time t.  VoteMgtijt = 1 (0) if the institutional investor votes 
against (for) firm j’s recommendation for nominee i at time t.  CTWj = 1 (0) if firm j is a CTW-firm.  Postt = 1 (0) if election takes place after 
(before) the CTW formation.  Unionj = 1 (0) if firm has (no) unionized workers in either the AFL-CIO or CTW coalition.  Standard errors, 
reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by election. 
 
 Fidelity Vanguard TIAA-CREF Carpenters 
VoteMgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CTW × Post  0.002  -0.056  -0.043  0.217* 
  (0.015)  (0.035)  (0.050)  (0.124) 
CTW  -0.005  0.085***  0.040  -0.235*** 
  (0.014)  (0.028)  (0.033)  (0.073) 
Post  -0.011  -0.112***  -0.038  0.133** 
  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.064) 
Union 0.003 0.007 -0.054*** -0.091*** -0.026 -0.049** -0.081* 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.045) (0.067) 
Union × Post  -0.009  0.046**  0.045  -0.083 
  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.037)  (0.096) 
Constant 0.012*** 0.017** 0.142*** 0.185*** 0.084*** 0.098*** 0.493*** 0.419*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.033) (0.046) 
Sample Firms All All All All All All All All 
# of Firms 455 455 467 467 460 460 343 343 
# of Observations 7,433 7,433 7,949 7,949 7,785 7,785 4,515 4,515 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
Table 7 
Effects of Unionization Strife and Labor Relations on AFL-CIO Votes 
This table presents the regression results of AFL-CIO proxy votes for director nominees 
as a function of labor strife at the plant level and union-firm workers’ affiliations.  The baseline 
specification is an OLS linear probability model:  
 
VoteMgtijt = α + β1(Strifejt × CTWj × Postt) + β2(CTWj × Postt) + β3(CTWj × Strifejt) +  
β4(Strifejt × Postt) + β5(Strifejt) + β6(CTWj) + β7(Postt) + β8(Unionj) +  
β9(Unionj × Postt) + β10(Unionj × Strifejt) + β11(Unionj × Strifejt × Postt) +  
β12(StockReturnjt) + β13(StockReturnjt × Postt) + β14(Yeart) + β15(Firmj) + εijt 
 
where subscripts ijt uniquely identify individual observations for nominee i, firm j, time t.  
VoteMgtijt = 1 (0) if the AFL-CIO votes against (for) firm j’s recommendation for nominee i at 
time t.  Strifeit = 1 (0) if there were (not) any charges filed by firm j against a labor union for 
unfair unionization practices in 2002.  CTWj = 1 (0) if firm j is a CTW-firm.  Postt = 1 (0) if 
election takes place after (before) the CTW formation.  Unionj = 1 (0) if firm has (no) unionized 
workers in either the AFL-CIO or CTW coalition.  Year and firm fixed effects are denoted by 
Yeart, Firmj, respectively.  Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are heteroskedasticity-robust 
and clustered by election. 
 
VoteMgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Strife × CTW × Post    -0.326*** -0.315** 
    (0.125) (0.125) 
CTW × Post  -0.311** -0.330*** -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.13) (0.083) (0.093) (0.093) 
Strife × Post    0.257 0.249 
    (0.192) (0.190) 
Union × Post   -0.109 -0.023 -0.022 
   (0.201) (0.054) (0.054) 
Union × Strife      
      
Union × Strife × Post    -0.095 -0.092 
    (0.206) (0.203) 
Strife 0.177***     
 (0.032)     
CTW  0.020    
  (0.070)    
Post  0.093 -0.079 0.089 0.061 
  (0.080) (0.249) (0.086) (0.086) 
Constant 0.335*** 0.507*** 0.835*** 0.282*** 0.279*** 
 (0.013) (0.042) (0.163) (0.087) (0.088) 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Firms All Union All All All 
Strife=1 No Yes Yes No No 
# of Observations 10,407 2,263 2,298 10,407 10,390 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 8 
Effects of Collective Bargaining Conflict and Labor Relations on AFL-CIO Votes 
This table presents the regression results of AFL-CIO proxy votes for director nominees 
as a function of labor strife at the plant level and union-firm workers’ affiliations.  The baseline 
specification is an OLS linear probability model:  
 
VoteMgtijt = α + β1(Strifejt × CTWj × Postt) + β2(CTWj × Postt) + β3(CTWj × Strifejt) +  
β4(Strifejt × Postt) + β5(Strifejt) + β6(CTWj) + β7(Postt) + β8(Unionj) +  
β9(Unionj × Postt) + β10(Unionj × Strifejt) + β11(Unionj × Strifejt × Postt) +  
β12(StockReturnjt) + β13(StockReturnjt × Postt) + β14(Yeart) + β15(Firmj) + εijt 
 
where subscripts ijt uniquely identify individual observations for nominee i, firm j, time t.  
VoteMgtijt = 1 (0) if the AFL-CIO votes against (for) firm j’s recommendation for nominee i at 
time t.  Strifeit = 1 (0) if there were any (zero) unfair labor practice charges filed against firm j for 
refusing to bargain collectively with employee representatives in 2002.  CTWj = 1 (0) if firm j is a 
CTW-firm.  Postt = 1 (0) if election takes place after (before) the CTW formation.  Unionj = 1 (0) 
if firm has (no) unionized workers in either the AFL-CIO or CTW coalition.  Year and firm fixed 
effects are denoted by Yeart, Firmj, respectively.  Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by election. 
 
VoteMgt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Strife × CTW × Post    -0.152 -0.141 
    (0.126) (0.126) 
CTW × Post  -0.256** -0.210** -0.066 -0.066 
  (0.122) (0.086) (0.093) (0.093) 
CTW × Strife    -0.026 -0.051 
    (0.130) (0.129) 
Strife × Post   0.063 0.039 0.043 
   (0.136) (0.065) (0.066) 
Union × Post      
      
Union × Strife    0.021 0.038 
    (0.151) (0.149) 
Union × Strife × Post 0.139***     
 (0.029)     
Strife  0.088    
  (0.067)    
Post  0.030 -0.109 0.100 0.067 
  (0.068) (0.223) (0.086) (0.086) 
Constant 0.330*** 0.467*** 0.557*** 0.274*** 0.271*** 
 (0.013) (0.035) (0.187) (0.087) (0.088) 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Firms All Union All All All 
Strife=1 No Yes Yes No No 
# of Observations 10,407 3,234 3,343 10,407 10,390 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 9 
AFL-CIO Funds’ Turnover (2003-2006) 
 This table presents descriptive statistics summarizing the AFL-CIO Funds’ holdings of 
sample firms in which the AFL-CIO funds participate in director elections.  For each year 
(column), Firms added (dropped) is the number of firms added (dropped) to the AFL-CIO’s 
portfolios relative to the holdings of the previous (next) year.  Unionized firms refer to any firms 
in which there are unionized workers in either the AFL-CIO or the CTW Coalition.  The number 
of firms added or dropped as a percentage of the total number of firms held in the given year’s 
portfolio is reported in parenthesis.  Total firms are the total number of firms that hold director 
elections in which the AFL-CIO funds participate. 
 
AFL-CIO Fund 
Holdings 2003 2004 2005 2006 
-- 73 39 49 Firms Added (all) 
 
  (19%) (10%) (13%) 
22 41 54 -- Firms dropped (all) 
 
 (6%) (11%) (14%)  
-- 33 15 18 Union Firms Added 
 
  (9%) (4%) (5%) 
6 17 30 -- Union Firms Dropped 
 
 (2%) (4%) (8%)  
-- 9 7 5 CTW-Firms Added 
 
  (2%) (2%) (1%) 
0 3 8 -- CTW-Firms Dropped 
 
 (0%) (1%) (2%)  
Total firms 343 384 378 387 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  
AFL-CIO Funds’ Director Votes as a Function of Firm Worker-Union Affiliation  
This figure illustrates AFL-CIO funds’ votes for directors across all sample firms. Each pair of columns represents the percentage of AFL-
CIO fund votes withheld from directors across three groups of firms (% against directors given on y-axis).  The leftmost pair represents firms 
whose workers are not unionized, the middle pair portrays AFL-CIO-firms, and the rightmost pair depicts CTW-firms.  ‘Before’ and ‘After’ refer 
to the time periods surrounding the breakup of the AFL-CIO.  Solid colored (striped) columns are for directors of firms whose workers are (not) 
primarily affiliated with the AFL-CIO at the time of the election.  
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0%
Before      After Before      After Before      After
* Before and After refer to the date of the director election relative to the AFL-CIO split
** Standard Errors are at most 2.5% in each column
